Discussion in 'Amateur Radio News' started by AA7BQ, Oct 11, 2006.
Please don't group me in with the Democrats, whether that have code or not......
"Please don't group me in with the Democrats, whether that have code or not......".
Being lumped in with democrats. Now that's down-right nasty!.
whoppity whoop ding dong all day long
FACT: There are ZERO repeaters down. All three of the Dallas Amateur Radio Club repeaters are operating. The primary RACES repeater is the DARC 146.88. The K5JD repeater is the primary alternate. The TI repeater, the Irving repeater, the Richardson repeater, the Garland repeaters, the Mesquite repeater, the SW Dallas County repeater, and a ton of others are all operating. ALL of them cover all of Dallas county, and well into adjoining counties.
FACT: Even IF a repeater went down, it would have ZERO impact on our ability to conduct a net.
FACT: Each city RACES group has at least THREE available repeaters, in addition to the county-wide primary and alternates.
FACT: Each surrounding county has a minimum of THREE repeaters -- one primary and two alternates.
The state is involved in disaster planning and mitigation. The state RACES charter is completely different from that of county and city RACES organizations -- who are listed as "first responders". There is no "command" of local RACES by the state -- and no requirement for mutual membership. Only very key members of local RACES (usually a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 10 per county) are also members of the state RACES organization -- and are authorized on state RACES frequencies.
FACT: The State of Texas Governor's Office of Emergency Management lists over 15 DFW area amateur radio clubs (among the 28 listed in North Texas), several RACES and ARES groups, and links to several sites with other amateur radio links.
We choose to rely upon facts.
To most of us who travel, "SFO" is short for "San Francisco".
No, I do not speak names of customers. The reasons should be obvious to anyone with intelligence and/or crypto background.
Nobody has proven ANY of my statements to be false for one very good reason: They are true. On the other hand, several of your statements have failed the "truth test" in spectacular fashion, yet you continue to dig yourself in deeper with more wild "observations" that are immediately disproven.
I strongly suggest that anyone who wants to validate my crypto-related statements find and read David Kahn's book "The Codebreakers". This is widely known in the industry as "The Bible of Cryptography".
I have no more time for this nonsense.
Um, Larry? how, precisely does your "FACT" jibe with The Dallas Amateur Radio Club Home Page which pretty clearly states that the 2m and 32cm machines are not up?
If you're going to make up "FACT"s like this, you really should stop making up ones that are so easy to dispell.
I hope you don't mind if I don't bother to check the rest of your "FACT"s, but given your track record to date, it hardly seems worth the effort.
I've been travelling for forty years Larry, twenty five of that in and out of the Bay area and I never once met anyone who confused a regional airport with the name of one of the cities it serves.
And, if I could be bothered to go back and pick out your two quotes on the topic, it would be very clear that you hadn't done that either.
But it doesn't matter, because none of what you claimed about San Francisco was true either, and I've pointed out documentation that clearly demonstrated it.
Right: they don't exist. Never have, never will.
Well, except you said that San Francisco was begging for hams during Loma Prieta, and it wasn't; you've said that DARC doesn't have any repeaters down and they do; you said the only communications in and out of NOLA for days after Katrina was amateurs, but the BBC was using the internet; you said that Dakotek never produced software based crypto and they did; you said, oh heck, I've lost track of all the things you've said that have been disproven rather easily.
Um, no, Larry. Kahn's book, which comes in two editions, one with some basic math, and one without, is a history of the codebreaking, not the cryptography industry, and it's only current to a couple of decades ago. I've got it in my library. The larger edition doesn't even cover the math of crypto very well, beyond the easy stuff from thirty years ago.
Anyone who wants to read "the bible" of cryptography these days would read Schneier; of whom, I suspect, you haven't heard, other than my throwaway line elsewhere in this thread.
That's Bruce Schneier, Larry, in case you want to catch up on what's gone on in cryptography in the 20 years since you made level converters. I recommend you start with Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, which is probably general enough for you to follow.
Then, when you're done with that, I recommend Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, Second Edition, which will show you why the people who've followed this thread and know about cryptography are laughing about what you've said on the topic.
You have a very superficial knowledge of cryptography, Larry, and it seems to have calcified sometime around 1985. The ensueing twenty years has rather changed the subject.
Ha!!! This is great! Of course, there is no correlation to the "real" NAACP -- let's not forget that; we don't want to go there...
Oh, this is just too good to pass up.....
The Dallas Amateur Radio Club now has FOUR repeater frequencies on FOUR different bands.
and a new 903 MHz machine
There are primary and back-up repeaters for each frequency. (For RACES, there are also fully separate back-up repeaters on primary and alternate back-up frequencies.)
Like I said (and like the page you cited said, had it been read correctly), "There are ZERO repeaters down." In point of fact, I had talked on the DARC 2 meter machine on the way home yesterday.
My FACTS are quite plainly 100% correct.
I cannot speak of specific customers because that would violate the security clearances issued by those various governments. Any modestly clever idiot should be able to understand that.
Typical conversation: "Where are you headed?" "SFO" Most people understand that you are going somewhere NEAR San Francisco. Many of us tend to say that even when we are actually flying into SJC.
As anyone with cryptographic knowledge and experience will happily tell you, codeBREAKING is an essential skill for one who wishes to create devices and/or systems that DEFEAT codebreaking. Every device or system that has ever been invented by a person without codeBREAKING knowledge an skills has shown "freshman weaknesses" that made it easily breakable. Hence, the respect for David Kahn's very most essential and very complete work.
Bruce Schneier tends to talk about risk recognition and avoidance. He is focused on the somewhat admittedly (by him) impossible task of securing networked computers and systems, using TACTICAL-level encryption and access protection. He does NOT address any STRATEGIC-level issues.
My experience is in the Strategic, Diplomatic, and high-level Tactical arenas. At the first two levels, denial of access to devices, keying materials, plaintext messages, wiring, and operating logs are STANDARD PRACTICE. Code rooms are sealed, electronically shielded, access controlled (typically with both an armed guard and at least one level of electronic access control on the room itself), heavily alarmed, highly restricted access "vaults". Wiring into and out of the room is in sealed, alarmed conduits. All wiring is filtered, and monitored for extremely small deviations in voltage or current with highly sensitive alarm circuits. Fiber optic cables are in alarmed conduits and have sensors that can detect if even a tiny probing sensor has been attached.
The design of a Strategic-level, Diplomatic-level, or high-security Tactical device must FORCE the attacker to attack your CRYPTO FACILITY.
In Schneier's computer world, physical security -- even when well implemented -- is very far below the level of any Strategic environment. The network security has enough holes that it is basically a "fine mesh strainer" -- with mesh that is sometimes not at all fine. The security of individual work stations and/or computers is just about laughable -- even in well-managed environments.
That does not mean that Schneier is either insincere or that he is unknowledgeable. It does mean that he is working within the bounds of an environment that normally ranges from LOW-LEVEL TACTICAL up to HIGH-LEVEL TACTICAL. He designs and/or implements systems that mostly meet the limits of his environment -- and the desire for "security" that is "easy to use".
None of his systems meet Strategic-level requirements, for the simple reason that Strategic-level encryption applied in a Tactical-level environment cannot yield more than a Tactical level of security -- but risks compromise of a Strategic-level system.
Can I make my company's Network Operating Center PHYSICALLY secure ? Yes. Can I make my company's network totally secure -- and still useable for business ? Probably not in the real world.
Can I prevent anyone from breaking (deciphering WITHOUT the key) a Diplomatic message for at least multiple decades ? Yes. Can an enemy BUY or THREATEN one of my people more easily than they can attack my Diplomatic crypto system ? Yes. Does this force someone to do something that I have an opportunity to know about -- and use to my own advantage ? BINGO !
And (drumroll....) Is there a crypto system that is 100% unbreakable (both theoretically and in practice) ? Yes.
Real cryptography has not materially changed. If a device (or system) does not very closely approximate a fully random output, it is still worthless. If elements of the language appear in the output, the device (or system) is worthless. If having the device (or system) aids the attacker, the device (or system) is worthless. If any attack other than Exhaustive Search (a.k.a. "brute force") works against the device (or system), the device (or system) is worthless.
Truth yesterday. Truth today. Truth tomorrow. Truth next century. Anyone who laughs at these truths laughs only to try to cover complete ignorance of cryptography.