KC2HJN
03-07-2004, 10:28 PM
AG4YO..no offence taken. (except maybe to the whiner statement…I’m not whining. I was a strong Bush supporter until I started to see holes appear in the official story and started doing my own research. But anyway..I’ve been called worse)
It is very hard to convince people that they might have been lied to on such a large scale. We all believe that Clinton lied on the stand about Monica, that's what most normal people would do if asked if they cheated on their spouse. But most don't know is that Clintons good economy was also a lie. He used social security money as general funds thus giving the appearance of a surplus that didn't really exist. Now that the well is running dry, we hear Greenspan warning us to cut SS or there will be no more money. People tend to accept small lies but not the real big ones.
Some may say that our Gov't would never do such a thing because it is so terrible. History should teach us otherwise. The German people loved Hitler before WWII, only afterwards did they realize the propaganda they were told and how much they were lied to.
Did you ever hear of operation northwoods? It was discovered through FFOA documents that the US Government in the 1960's planned staged attacks on Cuban and American targets to frame Castro and gain public support for military action against Cuba. The Plan was stopped at the highest level of our gov't, but the joint chiefs were ready to carry it out if given the ok. This is not opinion or guesswork, the documents exist.
Some things to ponder:
1999. #The U.S. was warned by British intelligence in 1999 that terrorists were planning to use airplanes in unconventional ways, perhaps as bombs.
i # # Summary.
(A) # In 1999, Britains intelligence agency, M16, warned the U.S. in a classified report that al Qaeda was planning to use airplanes in an unconventional manner to attack U.S. interests. #No targets were specified. #The Sunday Times quoted a British senior Foreign Office source saying, The Americans knew of plans to use commercial aircraft in unconventional ways, possibly as flying bombs. #[Sunday Times, 6/9/02 cited in AFP 6/9/02]
April to May 2001. #U.S. government received specific threats of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets or interests.
i # # Summary.
(A) # Condoleezza Rice admitted that the U.S. government had received specific threats that al Qaeda attacks against U.S. targets or interests might be in the works. #There was a clear concern that something was up, #but it was principally focused overseas. #The areas of most concern were the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. #[CNN 5/17/02] She did not elaborate on where the intelligence originated, but the Independent of London, reported that the information had been relayed to Washington by British intelligence sources. #[Independent 5/18/02]
June 4. #Pakistanis in Cayman Islands were overheard discussing planned hijacking attacks in New York City
i # # Summary.
(A) # Fox News reported, Pakistanis were taken into custody June 4 in the Cayman Islands after they were overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City; they were questioned and released, and the information was forwarded to U.S. intelligence. [Fox News 5/17/02] (it is unclear if this event is related to the August 29 anonymous letter mentioned below.
ii # # Who received this information.
(A) # U.S. intelligence. [Fox News 5/17/02]
June 6, 2001. German intelligence warned CIA.
i # # Summary.
(A) # The German intelligence agency, the BND, warned both the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture. #This intelligence reportedly came from Echelon, a high-tech electronic surveillance system used by the intelligence agencies of several nations to glean through electronic communications for certain keywords. #It was first reported by the German daily newspaper, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung on September 13. #Its sources were reportedly from the BND itself. [Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung 9/11/01 (German); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01; Fox News 5/17/02]
July 16, 2001. #British intelligence sent a report to Tony Blair warning of imminent attacks. #The report was also sent to Washington.
i # # Summary.
(A) # The British Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) sent a memo authored by the heads of British intelligence agencies, MI6, MI5 and GCHQ, to Tony Blair and other cabinet ministers, warning that al Qaeda was in the final stages of preparing for a terrorist attack. #The memo suggested that the attacks would likely be aimed at American or Israeli targets. #The report did not indicate however that the agencies had any knowledge with regards to the timings, targets and methods of attack. #According to the Times of London, the warning was based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency [Profile], which has staff working jointly with GCHQ. #[emphasis added] #The newspaper added, The CIA sometimes has a representative on the JIC. The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall confirmed. # [London Times, 6/14/02]
#
June 23, 2001. #Arabic News Network reported that bin Laden had predicted a severe blowto the U.S.
i # # Summary.
(A) # The Arabic satellite television channel MBC reported on June 23, [T]he next two weeks will witness a big surprise. #A severe blow is expected against U.S. and Israeli interests worldwide. MBC revealed that its reporter had #met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan just two before and noted, There is a major state of mobilization among the Osama bin Laden forces. It seems that there is a race of who will strike first. Will it be the United States or Osama bin Laden? #An Airline News Wire report carried by Airlinebiz.com quoted Bob Monetti, a special advisor to the FAA on security related matters, who told the news agency, The airlines are at risk -- They need to take all appropriate measures and counter-measures to ensure the safety of their passengers. # [Airline News Wire 6/23/01]
ii # # Who received this information.
(A) # The FAA. [Airline News Wire 6/23/01]
(B) # #The U.S. State Department. [Airline News Wire 6/23/01]
Summer, 2001. #Jordons General Intelligence Division (GID) warned Washington of an attack planned on the U.S. mainland using aircraft.
i # # Summary.
(A) # According to John Cooley , author of the book, Unholy Wars: America, Afghanistan, and International Terrorism, Jordans GID intercepted key intelligence indicating that a terrorist operation, code-named Al Ourush al Kabir or The Big Wedding, was being planned for within the U.S. and would involve aircraft. #Cooley confirmed the validity of this warning. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02 ; Pravda 5/24/02] That Washington did actually receive this warning was given further credence when on July 10 2002, in a New York Times article regarding Jordanian and U.S. military cooperation, Eric Schmitt wrote: The United States and Jordan have also carried out intelligence cooperation for many years. [New York Times 7/10/02]
#
Third week in July. #Taliban foreign minister sent aide to warn U.S. consul in Pakistan and UN office in Kabul that al Qaeda was planning a major imminent attack against Americans on U.S. soil.
i # # Summary.
(A) # On September 7 2002, the Independent of London revealed that in July of 2001, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yildash, informed then Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil that al Qaeda was planning an imminent attack against Americans on U.S. soil. Then, in the third week of July, the foreign minister sent his aid, whose name was not revealed by the Independent, to the Pakistani border town of Peshawar where the Taliban emissary met with and warned U.S. consul general, David Katz. #But the warning was ignored, so the minister redispatched his aid to the UN office, which also failed to pass the warning up to higher authorities. [Independent 11/7/02]
ii # # Details.
(A) # Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil met with the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yildash.
(1) # # The Independent reported, According to the emissary [the aid to the Taliban foreign minister], Mr Muttawakil emerged from a one-to-one meeting with Mr Yildash looking shocked and troubled. Until then, the Foreign Minister, who had disapproved of the destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamian earlier in the year, had no inkling from others in the Taliban leadership of what Mr bin Laden was planning. The British daily quoted the emissary who explained, #At first Muttawakil wouldn't say why he was so upset. #Then it all came out. Yildash had revealed that Osama bin Laden was going to launch an attack on the United States. It would take place on American soil and it was imminent. Yildash said Osama hoped to kill thousands of Americans. #[Independent 11/7/02; Reuters 9/7/02]
(B) # #Wakil Ahmed Muttawakils response to the revelation.
(1) # # He was unhappy about al Qaedas plans.
(a) # # According to the Independent, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil was disheartened by the news because he feared that the Taliban's protection of Mr bin Laden and the other al-Qa'ida militants would lead to nothing less than the destruction of Afghanistan by the US military. He reportedly told his aide, The guests are going to destroy the guesthouse, referring to al Qaeda. # The minister was known to be deeply unhappy with the foreign militants in Afghanistan, including Arabs, reported the Independent. [Independent 11/7/02]
© # #Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil sent an aid (unnamed) to Pakistan to warn U.S. consulate.
(1) # # Summary.
(a) # # The aid told the Independent of London that in the third week of July, he met the U.S. consul general, David Katz, in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar. #The paper reported, They met in a safehouse belonging to an old mujahedin leader who has confirmed to The Independent that the meeting took place . . . Another US official was also present #possibly from the intelligence services. . . . [Unnamed] US sources said the warning was not passed on. The aid also explained to the Independent, I told Mr Katz they should launch a new Desert Storm #like the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait #but this time they should call it Mountain Storm and they should drive the foreigners out of Afghanistan. They also had to stop the Pakistanis supporting the Taliban. [Independent 11/7/02]
(2) Response from U.S. officials
(a) David Katz
(i) Mr Katz, who now works at the American embassy in Eritrea, declined to talk about the meeting. [Independent 11/7/02]
(b) diplomatic source,
(i) #He or she explained to the Independent, We were hearing a lot of that kind of stuff. When people keep saying the sky's going to fall in and it doesn't, a kind of warning fatigue sets in. I actually thought it was all an attempt to rattle us in an attempt to please their funders in the Gulf, to try to get more donations for the cause. [Independent 11/7/02; Reuters, 9/7/02]
©One source
(i) #He or she told the Independent, As I recall, I thought he was speaking from his own personal perspective. #It was interesting that he was from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but he gave no indication this was a message he was carrying. [Independent 11/7/02]
(D) # #Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil sent an aid (unnamed) to Pakistan to warn a UN office in Kabul.
(1) # # Summary.
(a) # # The emissary then went to UNSMA, the political wing of the UN, in Kabul. Officials there listened to his warning but did report it to UN headquarters. A UN official familiar with the warnings told the Independent, He appeared to be speaking in total desperation, asking for a Mountain Storm, he wanted a sort of deus ex machina to solve his country's problems. But before 9/11, there was just not much hope that Washington would become that engaged in Afghanistan. [Independent 11/7/02]
iii # # Current status of Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil.
(A) # According to the Independent, Mr Muttawakil is now unavailable for comment #he handed himself in to the Afghan authorities in the former Taliban stronghold of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan last February. He is reported to be in American custody there, one of the few senior members of the Taliban regime the US has managed to arrest. [Independent 11/7/02]
End of July. 2001. #Intelligence sources warned Argentine Jewish leaders of imminent attacks.
i # # Summary.
(A) # According to Argentine Jewish leaders, the Jewish community in that country #received a warning about an impending major terrorist attack against the United States, Argentina or France just weeks before September 11. #Forward quoted Marta Nercellas, a lawyer for the Delegaci #de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, or DAIA, Argentina's main Jewish representative body: It was a concrete warning that an attack of major proportion would take place, and it came from a reliable intelligence [source]. #And I understand the Americans were told about it. #[emphasis added] #[Forward 2/5/02]
#
Early August. #British intelligence warned U.S. of imminent attacks.
i # # Summary.
(A) # Britain warned the US of an imminent attack by al-Qaeda. The previous British warning was reportedly vague with regards to method, but this warning apparently specified multiple airplane hijackings. The Sunday Herald reported, Britain gave President Bush a categorical warning to expect multiple airline hijackings by the al-Qaeda network. #This warning was included in Bush's August 6 intelligence briefing. (see Pre9/11 U.S. intelligence) [Sunday Herald, 5/19/02]
August, 2001. #Moroccan intelligence warned Washington about large scale-operations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001
i # # Summary.
(A) # According to reports published in November 2001 by the French magazine, Maximale, and a Moroccan newspaper, al Ittihad al-Ichtiraki, Moroccos royal intelligence informed Washington that one of its agents, Hassan Dabou, who had penetrated al Qaeda, learned that bin Ladens organization was preparing large operations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001. #The agent, who later went to the U.S. to help its intelligence agencies, also informed Moroccan intelligence that bin Laden was very disappointed with the first WTC bombing which failed to bring the two towers down. But when Dabou was called to the US to report this information directly, he became isolated from the Al-Qaeda organization, which harmed the prevention of the Sept. 11 attacks, an unnamed French intelligence officer told the AFP. The CIA would neither conform nor deny the report. #[Agence France Presse, 11/22/01; International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02 ; Pravda 5/24/02; London Times, 6/12/02]
#
Second week of August, 2001. Israel warned U.S. about large-scale attacks on the U.S. mainland.
i # # Summary.
(A) # Two high ranking Mossad agents came to Washington and warned the FBI and CIA that between 50 and 200 terrorists had slipped into the US and were planning large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland and that the threat was imminent. #They warned that Americans would be very vulnerable. They also contended that the bin Laden, with possible Iraqi help, was behind the planned attacks. #[Telegraph 9/16/02, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/01; Jerusalem Post 9/17/01; Fox News 5/17/02] The Los Angeles Times later retracts the story after a CIA spokesman says, There was no such warning. Allegations that there was are complete and utter nonsense. [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/01]
August: a couple weeks before Sept. 11. #Russian intelligence warned of possible hijacking.
i # # Summary.
(A) # On Sept. 15, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on MSNBC that he had ordered Russian intelligence to warn the US Government in the strongest "possible terms" of imminent assaults on airports and government buildings. #A report in the Russian Izveztia on September 12 similarly reported that Russian intelligence had warned the U.S. of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil several times. #[Agence France-Presse, 9/16/01; Izveztia, 9/12/02; Fox News 5/17/02; MSNBC 9/15/01cited in From The Wilderness 4/22/02]
ii # # Statements.
(A) # Nikolai Patrushev, head of the FSB, Russias Intelligence Agency.
(1) # # On September 15 he told Interfax News agency that Russia had warned Washington on several occasions that terrorists would attack targets on American soil. #We had clearly warned them, he said adding that the U.S. did not pay the necessary attention. #He also revealed that Russia had known bin Ladens precise location until Sept. 11. #[Agence France-Presse, 9/16/01]
(B) # #Vladimir Putin, Russian President.
(1) # # #On Sept. 15, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on MSNBC that he had ordered Russian intelligence to warn the US Government in the strongest "possible terms" of imminent assaults on airports and government buildings [MSNBC 9/15/01cited in From The Wilderness 4/22/02]
iii # # Other.
(A) # Russian intelligence envoy met with U.S. intelligence the day after Sept. 11.
(1) # # Summary.
(a) # # The day after the attacks, a special Russian Intelligence envoy met with the Deputy Directors of the CIA delivering to them audiotapes of intercepted telephone communications which were directly related to the attacks. #The Russian Izveztia reported, Russian Intelligence Service states that behind the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York stand the organization of Usama bin Laden, Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and Taliban government. According to our intelligence agents among terrorists there were at least two Uzbeks, natives of Fergana who arrived in the USA on forged documents about ten months ago. A terrorist group which realized actions against the USA consisted of at least 25 people. All of them had a special training on the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan including piloting of an aircraft. [Izvestia, 9/12/02, (the story currently on the Izvestia web site has been edited to delete a key paragraph, the link is to a translation of the article from From the Wilderness)]
iv # # Observation.
(A) # The Izveztia report does not make clear precisely what information had been provided to Washington before 9/11. #
August 21. #Jordanian warned FBI of planned attacks against the World Trade Center and government buildings in Washington D.C.
i # # Summary.
(A) # Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian man who was serving time in a prison in Seminole county, Florida, warned the FBI that terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden was planning a spectacular attack on America that involved the World Trade Center in New York and government buildings in Washington, D.C. #He had learned of the attacks while in a British jail a few months earlier, from three inmates he had befriended whom he identified as Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous. All three had been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the US embassy bombings in 1998. #After listening to his warning, one FBI agent reportedly said, Is that all you have? Thats old news. #Agents showed no further interest in him until after 9/11. #The Florida FBI office claimed that they had checked his background after the initial interview and had determined that he was not credible. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02; Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
ii # # About Walid Arkeh.
(A) # He was born in 1967. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
(B) # #He is a Jordanian national who lived in Altamonte Springs, Florida. [Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
iii # # Circumstances of Arkehs attempts to warn the FBI.
(A) # While living in Altamonte Springs, Florida, Arkeh was convicted of dealing in stolen goods and slapping his child. #He absconded to England where he was arrested by British authorities. #He stayed in the British Brixton prison from September 2000 until July 20, 2001 when he was extradited to the U.S. #While at Brixton, he had met Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous, all three of whom had been indicted for their involvement in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. #From his association with the three men, he learned of the attacks that were being planned for New York and Washington. When he returned to Florida he decided that he would attempt to trade his knowledge of the attacks for freedom, asylum and protection. [Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
iv # # Details of the warning
(A) # In the Florida jail, Arkeh befriended Leroy Hardman, a bondsman who was also serving time, and got him to ask a friend of his, Russell Moncrief, to notify U.S. authorities, which Moncrief quickly did on August. 20. #The following day, two FBI agents, Kevin Hogan and John Weyrauch, met with Arkeh who explained to them that something big was going to happen in New York City and Washington. #He also said that the three inmates had called the 1993 attack on the WTC unfinished business. #He promised to tell them more if they would agree to his terms. #But the agents werent very impressed. #Is that all you have? Thats old news, Arkeh recalled one of them saying. #The agents left without attempting to draw more information from Arkeh. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02; Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
(B) # #A few weeks later, Arkeh grew concerned that the FBI agents had not yet returned to ask him more questions. #On September 9, Hardman requested to see Lt. Mark Metz, a corrections officer and old acquaintance. #But the lieutenant wasnt going to be available until Sept. 12. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
© # #On September 11, hours after the attacks, FBI agents Kevin Farrington and Wendy Evans came to the jail to meet with Arkeh and the bondsmen. #Hardman remembered telling them, You're coming a little late, aren't you? You should have been here three weeks ago. #Moncrief was also upset. #He told the Orlando Sentinel, It ticks me off to hear them [FBI] say they absolutely had no warning. #The bottom line is that they were contacted weeks before and told this guy had hard information about the bombings in Africa, and about future things in New York, with multiple targets, and they didn't act on it. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
v # # What else he knew.
(A) # He told the Orlando Sentinel almost a year later what else he had learned while in Britain: # A lot of United States government buildings were mentioned, airports, federal buildings. # The trade center was mentioned to me. When it got bombed and nothing happened to it. . . . One of the guys said, In '93 [when Muslim terrorists detonated a truck bomb at the trade center], it wasn't successful. But you can bet on it: It will now. He did not say if he had been this specific during his August 2001 interview with the FBI. #[Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
vi # # Walid Arkehs post-9/11 detention.
(A) # The Orlando Sentinel reported on January 6, 2002 that after the attacks, he had been whisked to an undisclosed location by state corrections officials, after which, His name and photo -- all traces of his presence in the system #[were] #removed from the Department of Corrections Web site. #[Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
(B) # #Later it was learned that he had been immediately relocated to a Florida prison and then transferred to New York City's Metropolitan Correctional Center where he stayed until he returned to Florida in August 2002. He is now in a north Florida prison. While in New York, he was interviewed by federal investigators #who apparently had not been informed that Arkeh had foreknowledge of the attacks. #The Sentinel reported that at one point during one of his interviews he was curious why no one had asked him about Sept. 11, which he assumed was the main reason he had been brought to New York. #I was brought here for what reason? he said. I was in jail in Florida, and I called the federals to come so I could tell them about September 11. #Arkeh said everyone in the room looked stunned. One agent took off his glasses, put them on the conference table and then said, What do you mean, 'September 11'? #Arkeh explained: I'm the one who called the FBI and told them that there was going to be an attack on the United States and that it would be on New York City. And I was told by the Taliban on that. You haven't asked me one question about it. #Let me tell you something, Arkeh recalled the agent saying. If you know what happened in New York, we are all in deep s---. We are in deep trouble. #[Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02] #
vii # # Statements by FBI officials.
(A) # Bill Hajesky, the FBI's Orlando supervisor of special agents.
(1) # # He told the Orlando Seminole, We do not put any credibility into what he said. #And when we checked into his background, we found he wasn't credible. [Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
(B) # #FBI general.
(1) # # The Orlando Sentinel reported on January 6, 2002, The FBI won't provide details of conversations they had with Arkeh either before or after the tragedies. [Orlando Sentinel 1/6/02]
(2) # # Shortly after the publication of the January 6, 2002 Orlando Sentinel article, the FBI released a statement saying, In fact, this individual was interviewed on four occasions; the information vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated. [Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
© # #Sara Oates, a spokeswoman for the Tampa and Orlando FBI offices.
(1) # # The FBI Orlando interviewed Mr. Arkeh on several occasions. #We followed up the information he provided, and Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11. FBI Tampa has no current interest in Mr. Arkeh. [Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
(D) # #Jim Margolin, FBI spokesman for the Southern District of New York
(1) # # The Orlando Sentinel reported on October 30, 2002, that he said he could not comment on what Arkeh told investigators in New York between May and August because of the open investigations into the embassy bombings and the Sept. 11 attacks. #[Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02]
viii # # Observations.
(A) # It is not clear how the FBI determined that Arkeh was not credible given that the agents had confirmed the identities of the three associates of bin Laden who were in the British prison. #One would think that this confirmation would have made Arkeh a very credible witness.
(B) # #After Arkeh had conveyed the warning to the two FBI agents on August 21, one of the agents presumably said, Is that all you have? Thats old news. #The implication of this statement is that it was common knowledge among the federal authorities that al Qaeda was planning imminent attacks against the World Trade Center and buildings in Washington.
August 23. #Israel provided the U.S. with a list of 19 suspected terrorists living in the U.S.
i # # Summary.
(A) # According to German newspapers, the Mossad provided the CIA with a list of 19 terrorists living in the US. It is unknown if these were the same 19 names as the actual hijackers or if this number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and do match the names of 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. The Israeli intelligence agency told their US counterparts that they appeared to be planning an attack to be executed in the near future. #[Die Zeit 10/1/02, Der Spiegel 10/1/02, BBC 10/2/02, Haaretz 10/3/02] The Mossad probably learned about this through their "art student" spy ring. #(Possible Israeli 9/11 Foreknowledge) #Apparently this warning and list were not considered important by the CIA, who did obviously did not follow up on the warning. #Nor was this information passed on to the FBI. Its not clear if this warning influenced the addition of Alhazmi and Almihdhar's names to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [Der Spiegel 10/1/02] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [Haaretz 10/3/02] The US has denied knowing about Atta before 9/11, despite other media reports to the contrary.
August 29. #A radio station in the Cayman Islands received an anonymous letter warning of the attacks.
i # # Summary.
(A) # A radio station in the Cayman Islands, Cayman Radio, received an unsigned letter claiming that three Afghans who had entered the country illegally were agents of Osama bin Laden. [Miami Herald 9/20/01; #The letter warned that they were organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines. The letter was forwarded to a Cayman government official but no action is taken until after 9/11. The author reportedly met with the FBI shortly after 9/11, but told them that his information was a premonition of sorts. The three men were later identified and arrested. They had already been the subject of probes by Cayman and British investigators during the previous year. Its unclear what happened to them after their arrest. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, MSNBC, 9/23/01]
ii # # Background on the three men and the anonymous letter.
(A) # On August 22, 2000, three Afghan men, Nez Nazar Nezary, Mohammad Raza Hussani and Ali Sha Yusufi, were detained by the Royal Cayman Islands Police. #They claimed that they had come to the Islands by a ship from Turkey bound for Canada and had been ferried ashore to the islands under the impression that it was Canada. [Cayman Government 9/16/01; Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01]
(B) # #Further investigation by authorities raised doubts concerning the mens account. #Instead, it was believed that they had arrived at the Islands on August 20 on a flight from Cuba using Pakistani passports. #The Pakistani passports were never located. #[Cayman Government 9/16/01]
© # #On June 5, 2001, the Cayman Islands Grand Court allowed the three men to be released under the condition that they reside in a guest house in Grand Cayman and report to Immigration authorities and the RCIP on a daily basis, which they did. #[Cayman Government 9/16/01]
(D) # #A person, who did not identify him/herself, presented Mr. Loxley Banks, the Director of Broadcasting of Radio Cayman, with a letter signed only, a concerned Caymanian. #In the letter, the author wrote: Mr. Walton we have an urgent situation with the three Afghanistans that we have in our midsts for the past months. I have been convinced that they are agents of Osama Bin Laden - one of the world's greatest terrorist - operating out of - you guessed it - Afghanistan. The three agents here are organizing a major terrorist act against the U.S. via an airline or airlines. [Cayman Government 9/16/01]
(E) # # On September 6, 2001, the letter was passed to the Cayman Islands Government and received by Acting Chief Secretary Donovan Ebanks. [Cayman Government 9/16/01]
(F) # # Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, the author came forward and met with FBI agents. #He told them that his information was a premonition of sorts. [Cayman Government 9/16/01; Miami Herald, 9/20/01]
iii # # Text of the actual letter.
August 31, 2001. #Egyptian president warned U.S. that something was brewing.
i # # Summary.
(A) # The Associated Press reported that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had warned the U.S. that something would happen 12 days before the terrorist attacks. [AP 12/7/01; New York Times 6/4/02]. #And in an interview with the New York Times, the Egyptian president said that his country had warned Washington "Osama bin Laden's network was in the advance stages of executing a significant operation against an American target." #He further explained that this intelligence had been acquired "using a secret agent they had recruited who was in close contact with the bin Laden organization." #Mr. Mubarak's "intelligence chiefs tried unsuccessfully to halt the operation," he added. #[New York Times 6/4/02] US intelligence denied that they had received this information soon before the attacks and instead alleged that the only warnings that had been given to them from Egypt occurred between March and May of 2001. #[New York Times 6/4/02; ABC News 6/4/02]
Early September, 2001. #Iranian man warned U.S. authorities of a planned terrorist attack during the week of September 9.
i # # Summary.
(A) # A 29-year old Iranian man, Ali S., made several attempts to warn U.S. authorities of imminent terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center, reported both the German News Agency (DPA) and the Associated Press. He said that the attacks would occur during the week of Sept. 9. #The man, who was awaiting deportation in Langenhagen prison in northern Germany, presumably attempted to warn U.S. authorities of the attacks on at least 14 different occasions. # [Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9/13/01; Online.ie 9/14/01; AP 9/14/01; #Ananova 9/14/01; Sunday Herald, 9/16/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/17/01; Fox News 5/17/02]
ii # # Details of the warnings.
(A) # When the attacks would happen
(1) # # Ali warned that the attacks would happen during the week of Sept. 9. #[AP 9/14/01]
(2) # # Ali warned that the attacks would be directed at the World Trade Center. #[AP 9/14/01]
(B) # #How many times he attempted to warn, and who he tried to warn.
(1) # # He made 12 calls to the U.S., at least one of which was to the White House. #[AP 9/14/01]
(2) # # He made 2 calls to U.S. officials in Germany. #[AP 9/14/01]
(3) # # He requested, but was not given permission, to fax a warning to president Bush. #The German News Agency (DPA) reported, Just hours before the kamikaze airplane attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington he had asked in vain to be allowed to send a fax to U.S. President George W. Bush. #[Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9/13/01; AP 9/14/01]
iii # # Who knew about this warning.
(A) # The U.S. Secret Service.
(1) # # According to Online.ie, the US Secret Service informed German authorities about the calls after the attacks. #[Online.ie 9/14/01; Ananova 9/14/01]
(B) # #A White House operator.
(1) # # The AP reported, He obtained the authorization to call the White House, after police officers had agreed that he held significant information. #[AP 9/14/01]
© # #U.S. officials who were in Germany.
(1) # # The AP reported, Christian Pfeiffer, the Attorney General of Land de Basse Saxony, specified that the Iranian national had made 12 calls to the United States and two others to American officials in Germany to inform them of the imminence of the attacks. #[AP 9/14/01]
iv # # Information about the caller.
(A) # His name was Ali S. #[AP 9/14/01; Sunday Herald 9/16/01]
(B) # #He was 29 years old. # [Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9/13/01; Online.ie 9/14/01; AP 9/14/01; #Ananova 9/14/01; Sunday Herald, 9/16/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/17/01; Fox News 5/17/02]
© # #He was Iranian. #[Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9/13/01; Online.ie 9/14/01; AP 9/14/01; #Ananova 9/14/01; Sunday Herald, 9/16/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/17/01; Fox News 5/17/02]
(D) # #He was being detained at Langenhagen prison, after having illegally entered Germany a few weeks earlier. #[Online.ie 9/14/01; AP 9/14/01; Ananova 9/14/01; Fox News 5/17/02]
v # # Statements.
(A) # Frank Woesthoff, spokesman for the Lower Saxony Justice Ministry.
(1) # # He stated that the inmate had phoned the U.S. several times, but provided no further details. # [Online.ie 9/14/01; Ananova 9/14/01]
(B) # #Christian Pfeiffer, the Attorney General of Land de Basse Saxony.
(1) # # He specified that Ali had made 12 calls to the United States and two others to American officials in Germany to inform them of the imminence of the attacks. [AP 9/14/01]
© # #Official statement from German federal prosecutor.
(1) # # He does not know anything about the terrorists or of the details of the attacks. #His warnings to the American authorities were based on vague assertions of a danger to the peace of the world and the world order - he could not give any details. [AP 9/14/01]
vi # # #Confirmations.
(A) # German Police. # [Online.ie 9/14/01; Ananova 9/14/01]
(B) # #The Lower Saxony Justice Ministry. (Niedersachsen, Germany) [Online.ie 9/14/01; Ananova 9/14/01]
© # #US investigators. #[Fox News 5/17/02]
vii # # Denials.
(A) # See above statement from German Prosecutor. #[AP 9/14/01]
(B) # #Christian Pfeiffer, the Attorney General of Land de Basse Saxony, said doctors had examined Ali the week previous to the attacks and had determined that Ali was psychologically unstable. #[AP 9/14/01]
Early September. #A Moroccan man in a Brazilian prison warned of attacks.
i # # Summary.
(A) # The Sunday Herald - in report that briefly mentioned the case of the Iranian man, Ali S., who had called the U.S. from a German prison to warn of the attacks #also reported, Similar warnings also came from a Moroccan in a Brazilian jail. [Sunday Herald 9/16/01]
Early September. #The NSA intercepted communications of a close bin Laden associate
i # # Summary.
(A) # ABC News reported that the NSA had intercepted multiple phone calls from Abu Zubaida, bin Laden's chief of operations, to the United States. The timing and details contained in these intercepted phone calls has not been disclosed. [ABC News, 2/18/02]
Early September. #The British intercepted communications between bin Laden and at least two of his associates.
i # # Summary.
(A) # According to British inside sources, interviewed by the Sunday Times, shortly before September 11, bin Laden contacted an associate thought to be in Pakistan. The conversation referred to an incident that was to take place in the US on, or around 9/11, and includes a discussion of possible repercussions. Another intercept captured a conversation in which Laden spoke to an associate thought to be in Afghanistan. They discussed the scale and effect of a forthcoming operation and bin Laden praised his colleague for his part in the planning. Neither conversation specifically mentioned the WTC or Pentagon, but investigators had no doubt that they were referring to the 9/11 attacks. The British government obliquely made reference to these intercepts, when it said, There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release. These intercepts haven't been made more public because releasing full details could compromise the source or method of the intercepts. [Sunday Times, 10/7/01]
September 10, 2001. #
i # # Summary.
(A) # The National Security Agency (NSA) [Profile] intercepted conversations from al Qaeda that were extremely specific. #USA Today, reported Two U.S. intelligence officials, paraphrasing highly classified intercepts, say they include such remarks as, Good things are coming, Watch the news, Tomorrow will be a great day for us, # #[USA Today 6/3/02], Tomorrow is zero hour and the match is about to begin. #[AFP 6-21-2002] This information was contained with 13,000 pages of material from the National Security Agency [Profile] that was handed over to the Congressional 9-11 inquiry. #It is unclear when these intercepts were reviewed by U.S. intelligence. #They may not have been reviewed until after 9-11. #[USA Today 6/3/02; USA Today 6/19/02] #The president was angered by the fact that #Congress leaked this information to the press. #White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated, The president has deep concerns about the inappropriate disclosure of information that can compromise sources and methods and potentially interfere (with) and harm America's capacity to fight the war against terror. #[AFP 6-21-2002] #In fact, the FBI began aggressive investigations into who was responsible for the leak. #On August 1, Rollcall, reported, FBI agents began fanning out on Capitol Hill in recent weeks, questioning Senators serving on the Intelligence Committee as part of an unprecedented effort to find out who leaked classified information from the Congressional probe of intelligence failures prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. #FBI officials are also asking Hill staffers caught up in the investigation to submit to polygraph examinations, according to Congressional sources. #[Roll Call 8/1/02]
#
September 11, 2001 . #Employees at Odigo Inc, received warnings predicting the attacks hours before they happened.
i # # Summary
(A) # The Israeli company, Odigo, Inc. was apparently warned two hours before the attacks. #Odigo CEO Micha Macover told the Haaretz that two workers received the messages predicting the attack would happen. #The FBI was quickly notified, but it is unclear what the FBI did with the information. #It is also unknown to what extent U.S. authorities investigated the warnings and what their conclusions were. #[Ha'aretz 9/26/01, Washington Post 9/28/01; CNN 9/28/02; InfoWorld 9/28/02]
Sorry this is so long, but remember that after 9-11 our gov’t said this was a surprise attack and they had no idea this was coming. That was a lie. There are 100 more pages of stuff I can post here, but like I said…the information is out there. I’m not a ‘conspiracy theorist’. I lost a #friend that day (he worked for Cantor Fitzgerald) and don’t believe the ridiculous ‘official story’. It has been shot full of holes at every turn, but they still stick to it.
Anyway, this is long enough…if you want more I can point you in the right direction.
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KC2HJN
KC2HJN
03-09-2004, 12:02 AM
</span><table border="0" align="center" width="95%" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="1"><tr><td>Quote </td></tr><tr><td id="QUOTE">You're right HJN, there is more there than meets the eye.[/QUOTE]<span id='postcolor'>
At least we agree here.
</span><table border="0" align="center" width="95%" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="1"><tr><td>Quote </td></tr><tr><td id="QUOTE">My point is that we would not have know 9/11 could happen if we were looking right at it! You want to play the blame game? You'll have to throw a pretty big loop.[/QUOTE]<span id='postcolor'>
Sorry, this is where we start to disagree. If by saying 'we' you mean us average Americans, I might agree, but not if you mean the intelligence agencies. It's their job. They get paid to put these things together.
I don't think it's a game and if the loop needs to be big, so be it.
Also, I'm not looking to restrict anyones civil liberties. Quite the opposite.
</span><table border="0" align="center" width="95%" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="1"><tr><td>Quote </td></tr><tr><td id="QUOTE">Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.[/QUOTE]<span id='postcolor'>
Americans have a constitutional RIGHT to 'petition the government for a redress of grievances'. When they refuse to answer, they are the ones blocking civil liberties. Our leaders, good or bad, are not above the law. When a court of law rules that a member of our government should produce certain documents, and they don't, or repeatedly delay, what is one to think?
Anyway, I don't want to nit-pick everything you said. You have your opinion and I have mine. That's ok. That's one of the things that makes this country great, the ability to present those differing opinions. BUT, I will leave you with some more to read. http://www.qrz.com/iB_html/non-cgi/emoticons/smile.gif
With regard to not seeing it comming.
Project Bojinka was exposed in January 1995 when Philippine police arrested and tortured Abdul Hakim Murad in a Manila apartment where bomb-making equipment was found. He told them of plans to plant timed explosive devices on 11 US airliners simultaneously, and to crash-land an airplane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The preparations were so far advanced that Murad detailed the specific flights targeted, most of them trans-Pacific flights that would explode over the ocean. Murad had attended flying schools in the United States, earned a commercial pilot’s license, and told investigators he was to fly the plane into CIA headquarters. Another Islamic fundamentalist was to fly a second plane into the Pentagon. (Source: Washington Post, September 23, “Borderless Network of Terror, Bin Laden Followers Reach Across Globe,” by Doug Struck, Howard Schneider, Karl Vick and Peter Baker)
Later that year, the alleged organizer of the first World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was captured in Pakistan, turned over to US agents and flown back to the United States for trial. On the flight, Yousef reportedly boasted to FBI agent Brian Parr and the other agents guarding him that he had narrowly missed several opportunities to blow up a dozen airliners on a single day over the Pacific and to carry out a kamikaze-type suicide attack on CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Yousef was referring to the same plot for which Abdul Hakim Murad had been arrested in the Philippines. Murad was extradited to the United States, where his testimony played a major role in Yousef’s trial and conviction. (Source: John Cooley, Unholy Wars, New York, NY, 2000, p. 247)
Early in 1996, US officials had identified crop-dusters and suicide flights as potential terrorist weapons, and began taking elaborate steps to prevent an attack from the air during the Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Black Hawk helicopters and US Customs Service jets were deployed to intercept suspicious aircraft in the skies over the Olympic venues. Agents monitored crop-duster flights within hundreds of miles of downtown Atlanta. Law enforcement agents also fanned out to regional airports throughout northern Georgia “to make sure nobody hijacked a small aircraft and tried to attack one of the venues,” said Woody Johnson, the FBI agent in charge of the Atlanta office at the time. From July 6 through the end of the Games on August 11, the FAA banned all aviation within a one-mile radius of the Olympic Village that housed the athletes. It also ordered aircraft to stay at least three miles away from other sites beginning three hours before each event until three hours after each event ended. (Source: Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2001, “Suicide Flights and Crop Dusters Considered Threats at ’96 Olympics,” by Mark Fineman and Judy Pasternak)
As early as 1996 the FBI began investigating the activities of Arab students at US flight schools. Government officials admitted that “law enforcement officials were aware that fewer than a dozen people with links to bin Laden had attended US flight schools." FBI agents visited two flight schools in 1996 to get information about several Arab pilots who received training there. The two schools were among those attended by Abdul Hakim Murad, who had told Philippine and US police about plans to fly a hijacked plane into CIA headquarters. In 1998 FBI agents questioned officials from Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma about a graduate identified in court testimony as a pilot for Osama bin Laden. This was the school later attended by Zacarias Moussaoui. A Washington Post article concludes: “Since 1996, the FBI had been developing evidence that international terrorists were using US flight schools to learn to fly jumbo jets. A foiled plot in Manila to blow up U.S. airliners and later court testimony by an associate of bin Laden had touched off FBI inquiries at several schools, officials say.” (Source: Washington Post, September 23, 2001, “FBI Knew Terrorists Were Using Flight Schools,” by Steve Fainaru and James V. Grimaldi)
In the run-up to the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, there was active consideration of the danger of “a fully loaded, fuelled airliner crashing into the opening ceremony before a worldwide television audience,” according to former Sydney police superintendent Paul McKinnon. Osama bin Laden was considered the number one threat, he said. IOC officials said plane-crash catastrophes have been incorporated into security planning for every Olympics since 1972. “That was our nightmare scenario,” one IOC official said. There were extensive IOC discussions with the FBI during 2001 in the course of the security planning for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. (Source: Sydney Morning Herald, September 20, 2001, “Jet crash on stadium was Olympics nightmare,” by Jacquelin Magnay)
The 2000 edition of the Federal Aviation Administration’s annual report on Criminal Acts Against Aviation, published early in 2001, said that although bin Laden “is not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so,” adding, “Bin Laden’s anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, particularly to US civil aviation.” (Source: FAA)
Beginning in early 2001 a trial was held in New York City of four defendants charged with involvement in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The trial revealed that two bin Laden operatives had received pilot training in Texas and Oklahoma and another had been asked to take lessons. L’Houssaine Kherchtou, a bin Laden associate turned government witness, told the court how he was asked to take flying lessons in 1993. Another bin Laden aide, Essam al-Ridi, testified that he had bought a military aircraft for bin Laden and flown it to Sudan. Al-Ridi became a government witness in 1998, giving the FBI inside information about a pilot-training scheme three years before the September 11 attack. While the proceedings of the trial extended from February to July 2001, they did not produce any heightened alert in relation to US commercial aviation. (Source: Court transcript available at www.cryptome.org )
I didn't write the above, it was copied from somewhere else, but gives a partial summary of FBI knowledge of these kinds of attacks. Couple that with the various warnings and the Bush administration stonewalling and you can only reach two possible conclusions.
1. They really just didn't put it together and are totally incompetent, and therefore should be tossed out.
2.They knew it was going to happen and did nothing, and therfore should be impeached and arrested for treason.
Either way, they are responsible.
Yes we can argue about hindsight being 20/20, and that true to a degree, but how far can that excuse be stretched?
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